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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In

this

Brief,

"Plaintiffs".
groups*

The

the Appellants

will

be

referred

to

as

The Defendants can be classified into two (2)
Defendants

Fred

Hunsaker

and

Brian Chadaz

are

employees of Defendant First Federal Savings & Loan Association of
Logan ("First Federal"), and the Defendant Brad H. Bearnson is the
Trustee in the Trust Deed out of which this litigation arises.
These four (4) Defendants, First Federal Savings & Loan Association
of Logan, Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H. Bearnson, will
be referred to collectively as the "First Federal Defendants". N.
George Daines was legal counsel for Defendants Norman Barber and
Helen Barber who acquired

from First Federal Savings & Loan

Association of Logan the beneficial interest in the Trust Deed
above referenced.

These three (3) Defendants, N. George Daines,

Norman Barber and Helen Barber, will be referred to collectively
as the "Barber Defendants". This matter was before the Trial Court
on a Motion by the First Federal Defendants, joined in by the
Barber Defendants, to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to
prosecute their claim.

The Trial Court ruled upon said Motion

based upon the briefs submitted by counsel. For this reason, there
was

no

hearing

or evidence

and

hence

no

transcript

of

any

proceedings. The record on appeal consists entirely of the records
in the office of the Court Clerk and this record will be referred
to in this Brief by the designation "R" followed by the appropriate
page reference.

Attached as addenda to this Brief are copies of

the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated January
1

19, 1989

granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Trial Court's Findings
of Fact and Order dated January 21,

1989 dismissing Plaintiffs'

Complaint, the Trial Court's Memorandum Decision dated February 27,
1989, denying Plaintiffs' Motion For a New Trial, and the Trial
Court's formal Order Denying New Trial dated March 14, 1989.

The

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure will be referred to as "URCP". All
emphasis is added.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal
under U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)(j), being a case transferred to the Court
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This case is an appeal from a Decision and Order of the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen in the District Court of Cache
County, Utah entered January 27, 1989, dismissing Plaintiffs'
Complaint under Rule 41(b) of the URCP for failure to prosecute.
Following the entry of Judge Christoffersen's Order of Dismissal
with Prejudice of January 27, 1989, Plaintiffs filed a Motion For
a New Trial.

This Motion was denied by the Trial Court by

Memorandum Decision dated February 27, 1989 and by a formal Order
Denying New Trial dated March 14, 1989.

This appeal is taken by

the Plaintiffs from the Order of Dismissal and the Order Denying
a New Trial.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING

PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE?
2.

WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS A

HEARING ON THE MOTION OF THE FIRST FEDERAL DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR?

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL. STATUTORY RULES
The following are determinative Rules that support the relief
the First Federal Defendants seek:
1.

Rule 41(b) URCP:
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute *..
a defendant may move for dismissal of an action
or any claims against him.
. . . Unless the
court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision
and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack
of an indispensable party, operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.

2.

Rule 4-501(9), Code of Judicial Administration:
In cases where the granting of a motion would
dispose of the action or any issues thereon on
the merits with prejudice, the party resisting
the motion may request a hearing and such
request shall be granted.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs filed this action on November 3, 1983 and amended
their Complaint on November 28, 1983.

As amended, the Complaint

alleges four (4) causes of action seeking damages from alleged

3

wrongful conduct by the First Federal Defendants in foreclosing a
Trust Deed given by Plaintiffs as Trustors to First Federal as
Beneficiary, and from alleged wrongful conduct of the Barber
Defendants in acquiring the beneficial interest of First Federal
in said Trust Deed prior to the Trustee's foreclosure sale thereof
and in completing the Trustee's foreclosure sale of and under said
Trust Deed.

The case was pending in the District Court for over

five (5) years and during this time proceeded through a number of
actions by the parties that will be chronicled under the "Statement
of Facts" Section of this Brief.

After the case had been pending

for five (5) years, the First Federal Defendants, on November 25,
1988, moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint under Rule 41(b) URCP
for failure to prosecute.

This Motion was joined in by the Barber

Defendants and was resisted by Plaintiffs who, in response to said
Motion, concurrently filed (1) a Notice of Objection to Motion to
Dismiss,

(2) a Notice of Readiness For Trial, and (3) a Memorandum

Opposing Motion to Dismiss and Request For Hearing.
While said Motion to Dismiss was under consideration by Judge
Christoffersen, the Clerk of the Court placed the case on the trial
calendar.

Without hearing, the Trial Court, in a Memorandum

Decision dated January 19, 1989, granted the Motion to Dismiss.
On January 27, 1989, the Trial Court signed Findings of Fact and
an Order of Dismissal and therein struck the trial setting made by
the Clerk of the Court on February 6, 1989.
Motion For

Plaintiffs made a

a New Trial, which the Trial Court denied

in a

Memorandum Decision dated February 27, 1989, followed by a formal
4

Order Denying Motion signed March 14, 1989.

This appeal by

Plaintiffs from the Order granting the Motion to Dismiss and Order
Denying a New Trial followed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The procedural chronology of this case as shown from the
Clerk's file and as found by the Trial Court in its Findings of
Fact undergirding its Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint is as
follows:
1.

Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed November 3, 1983 (R-l) and

a Temporary Restraining Order was issued the same day to restrain
the First Federal Defendants from proceeding with a Trustee's sale
of Plaintiffs' property (R-ll).
2.

The

Trustee's

sale

scheduled

November

3,

1983

was

postponed one (1) day to November 4, 1983, and on November 4, 1983,
a hearing was held before the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen on
Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order.

As a result of the

hearing on November 4, 1983, the Court dismissed its Temporary
Restraining Order of November 3, 1983 (R-10 and 12), and the
Trustee's sale as rescheduled was conducted the same day.
3.

On November 7, 1983, the First Federal Defendants filed

an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint (R-14).
4.

On

November

28,

1983#

Plaintiffs

filed

an

Amended

Complaint (R-16).
5.

On December 8, 1983, the First Federal Defendants filed

an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint (R-44), and on December
5

15, 1983 the Barber Defendants filed their Answer to Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint (R-47).
6.

On February 3, 1984, the First Federal Defendants filed

a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (R-55) which the Court denied
in a Memorandum Decision dated March 19, 1984 (R-129).
7.

On March 21, 1984, the First Federal Defendants filed a

Notice of Readiness For Trial (R-131).

Plaintiffs objected to the

Notice on April 2, 1984, stating in their objection, "Plaintiffs
intend to prepare and complete discovery both with interrogatories
and depositions."
8.

(R-133)

On July 6, 1984, the First Federal Defendants filed a

Second Notice of Readiness For Trial (R-137), to which Plaintiffs
objected on July 11, 1984, stating "... plaintiffs are proceeding
with discovery."
9.

(R-146)

On July 11, 1984, Plaintiffs served Interrogatories and

a Request For Admissions on Defendants Chadaz and Bearnson (R-139),
to which Bearnson filed Answers on July 18, 1984 (R-148) and to
which Chadaz filed Answers on August 10, 1984 (R-152).
10.

On January 13, 1986, the Court, on its own motion, issued

an Order returnable January 27, 1986 for Plaintiffs to show cause
why

their

Complaint

should

not be dismissed

for

failure to

prosecute the same (R-157).
11.

On January 23, 1986, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the

Court's Order To Show Cause and in their Motion stated, "Plaintiffs
intend to bring this matter to trial after their evidence has been
completed.

The appraiser has not completed the work he indicated
6

would be done some time ago and Plaintiffs are reminding him of the
commitment to complete the work."

(R-159)

The case was not

dismissed.
12.

On January 27, 1987, the Court, on its own motion, issued

a second Order, returnable February 9, 1987, for Plaintiffs to show
cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute the same (R-160).
13.

On February 5, 1987, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the

Court's second Order To Show Cause, and in their motion stated,
"Plaintiffs have not left this case unpursued, but have been
preparing to go forward with it.

... They desire that this matter

eventually be set for trial, and anticipate being ready to file a
request within the year."

(R-161) On February 7, 1987, the Order

To Show Cause was dismissed (R-170).
14.

On February 6, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Request

For Admissions, First Set of Interrogatories and For Production of
Documents" on the Barber Defendants

(R-162).

These discovery

requests were answered by the Barber Defendants on March 11, 1987
(R-175).
15.

On September 4, 1987, the Barber Defendants moved the

Court for partial summary judgment (R-188), which motion was denied
by the Court's Memorandum Decision dated October 6, 1987 (R-215)
and Order dated October 26, 1987 (R-216).
16.

On November 25, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Request

For Admissions and Interrogatories" on the First Federal Defendants
(R-218).

Defendant

Bearnson
7

answered

said

Request

and

Interrogatories on December 27, 1987 (R-223).

Defendants Hunsaker

and First Federal answered the Request and Interrogatories on
December 23, 1987

(R-227), and Defendant Chadaz answered the

Request and Interrogatories on December 23, 1987 (R-231).
17.

On December 29, 1987, Plaintiffs propounded a Request For

Production of Documents to the Barber Defendants (R-235), and these
Requests were responded to by the Barber Defendants on January 4,
1988 (R-238).
18.

No action was taken by Plaintiffs on the claim from

December 23, 1987 until after November 25, 1988, when the First
Federal

Defendants

filed their Rule

41(b) Motion to

Dismiss

Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to prosecute.
Based upon the foregoing status of the record, the First
Federal Defendants made a Motion on November 25, 1988 pursuant to
Rule 41(b) URCP to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to
prosecute the same

(R-241).

The Motion was accompanied and

supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities (R-243).

On

December 1, 1988, the Barber Defendants joined in said Motion (R255).

On December 6, 1988, Plaintiffs filed a "Notice of Objection

to Motion

to

Dismiss"

(R-257).

Then

on

December

Plaintiffs

filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial

8, 1988,

(R-259) and

written "Objections and Memorandum Opposing Motion to Dismiss and
Request for Hearing" (R-261).

In their Memorandum, the Plaintiffs

argued their resistance to said Motion on the merits and cited to
the Court the same cases in support of their opposition to the
Motion that they now cite to this Court in their Appellants' Brief.
8

The First Federal Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum on
December 30, 1988 (R-265).

On December 2] , 1 988, while the Motion

of the First Federal Defendants was pending and before a decision
thereon had been made by the Tri al Cour t ; the Clerk set the case
for trial (R-268).

On December 30, 1988, the Barber Defendants

filed their Reply Memorandum (R-270).
On January" 19, 1 989, J udge Christoffersen Issued a Memorandum
Decision, noting the Plaintiffs' delay and concluding, "Even their
(Plaintiffs') responses do not produce logical reasons for failing
to proceed with the prosecution of their claim"

and ruling,

"Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted, ..." (R-273).
Formal Findinqs of Fact and Order were presented to the Court,
objected to by Plaintiffs and signed by the Court over Plaintiffs'
objection on January 27, 1989 (R-286).
Plaintiffs made a Motion for a New Tri al on February 6, 1 989 ,
which the Court denied in a Memorandum Decision on February 27,
1989 (R-304) and an "Order Denying New Trial" dated March 14, 1989
(R-305). This appeal followed the denial of Plaintiffs' Motion for
a New Trial (R-307).

SUMMARY OF ARGDMENTS
The decision

of

the Trial

Court

to dismiss

Plaintiffs'

Complaint: for failure to prosecute is discretionary wi th the Trial
Court. This Court will not reverse the decision of the Trial Court
unless the Trial Court has abused this discretion.

In this case,

Plaintiffs have made no showing that the Trial Court abused its
9

discretion, but rather the Defendants have shown ample evidence to
justify the Trial Court's Order of Dismissal. The dismissal by the
Trial Court did not violate Plaintiffs' rights to due process or
access to the courts for a remedy for an alleged wrong to them.
A concomitant to Plaintiffs' right of due process and access to the
court is the state's right to control its calendar.

This is an

inherent right of the Court as well as a right granted by Rule
41(b) URCP.

Plaintiffs were given reasonable opportunity to have

this case heard and forfeited that right by their own inaction,
delay and failure to prosecute their claims.
The failure of the Trial Court to grant Plaintiffs a hearing
on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was not reversible error where
Plaintiffs have provided not one fact, argument, case or piece of
evidence which was not already before the Court prior to entry of
the Order of Dismissal. Plaintiffs have shown no prejudice to them
at all resulting from the Trial Court's failure to grant the
requested hearing.
If this Court

finds the Trial Court's

failure to grant

Plaintiffs' hearing was reversible error, the remedy should be to
remand the case to the Trial Court for a hearing on Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute.

10

ARGUMENT
I.
DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE?
Rule 41(b) URCP provides in parts
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute ... a defendant may
move for dismissal of an action or any claim against him ...
The question of whether a plaintiff has failed to prosecute
an action lies within the discretion of the Trial Court.

In the

case o£ Charlie Brown Construction Co. Inc. v. Leisure Sports
Incorporated, 740 P .2d 1 368 (lit .ah A;pp

] 987), this Court he] d:

Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within the
broad discretion of the trial court.
This court will not
interfere with that decision unless it clearly appears that
the court has abused its discretion and that there is a
likelihood an injustice has been wrought. (P.1370)
In this case, the Plaintiffs offered no reasonable excuse to
the

Trial

Court

for

their

delay

in

prosecuting

their

case,

prompting Judge Christoffersen to find in his Memorandum Decision:
"Even their responses do not produce logical reasons for failing
to proceed wi th pr osecu tion of thei r cla i m- " (R-273) .

Nor have

Plaintiffs set forth in their Brief to this Court any

"logical

reason for failing to proceed with prosecution of their claim."
On

the other

hand

UKJ" record

contains

ample evidence of

Plaintiffs' delay, inactivity and failure to prosecute.

In summary

form that evidence is:
1.

Defendants filed Notices of Readiness for Trial twice,

once on March 21, 1984 and again on July 6, 1984 (R-131 and 137).
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Plaintiffs objected to both of these Notices and never, for a
period of some fifty-three (53) months until Defendants moved to
dismiss

for failure to prosecute, filed their own Notice of

Readiness for Trial (R-257).

We are left to speculate how much

longer Plaintiffs would have allowed this case to languish had
Defendants not moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint when they
did.
2.

The Trial Court twice, on its own Motion, issued Orders

to Plaintiffs to show cause why their Complaint should not be
dismissed (R-157 and 160).

In response to the first Order to Show

Cause dated January 13, 1986, Plaintiffs stated, "Plaintiffs intend
to bring this matter to trial after their evidence has been
completed.

The appraiser has not completed the work he indicated

would be done some time ago and plaintiffs are reminding him of the
commitment to complete the work." (R-159)

An entire year then

passed within which Plaintiffs' only activity was to submit a set
of

Interrogatories

and

Request

For Admissions

on the

Barber

Defendants (R-162). The Court then issued its second Order to Show
Cause on January 27, 1987, to which Plaintiffs replied, "Plaintiffs
have not left this case unpursued but have been preparing to go
forward with it . . . They desire that this matter eventually be set
for trial, and anticipate being ready to file a request within the
year."

(R-161)

The Plaintiffs made no affidavit and gave no

statement as to what they were doing to prepare nor did they file
a Notice of Readiness within the year.

12

3.

Each action taken by Plaintiffs during the entire history

of this case followed some affirmative action by Defendants or the
Court.

Plaintiffs' first discovery efforts occurred on July 11,

1984 (R-152), five (5) days after Defendants filed a Notice of
Readiness for Trial (R-146) and eight (8) months after Plaintiffs
filed

their

Complaint.

Plaintiffs'

second

discovery

effort

occurred on Fubruciiy (1» 1.98/ (R-175), ten (10) days alter the Court
ordered Plaintiffs to show cause why their Complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to prosecute

(R-160).

Plaintiffs' third

discovery effort occurred on November 25, 1987 (R-218), twenty-nine
(29) days after the Court denied the Barber Defendants' Motion for
Partia 1 Summai y

Judgmei i !: (R-216) .

Plai nti f f s ' fourth di scovery

effort occurred on December 29, 1987 (R-235), two (2) months and
three (3) days after the Court's denial of the Barber Defendants'
Motion, for Pa i: ti a ] Summary J udgment.

Had Defendants or the Court

not prodded Plaintiffs, they may never have taken even the minimal
affirmative action they did.
4.

In the period from commencement of the case on November

3, 1983 until the Motion of the First Federal Defendants to dismiss
on November

25 r

19 88

( a per iod

i n excess of

f i.ve

( 5 ) years) r

Plaintiffs' sole affirmative acts consisted of filing an Amended
Complaint and four (4) discovery requests.

Each discovery request

was promptly and t imely -responded to by

Defendants.

actions in fi we
approach

by

Five

(5)

(5) years indicates a very casual and dilatory

Plaintiffs

to

the

prosecution

of

their

claim.

Absolutely nothing happened so far as Plaintiffs pursuing their
13

claims between their last discovery request on December 29, 1987
and their Notice of Readiness for Trial on December 8, 1988.
Again, never once before the Trial Court or this Court have
Plaintiffs given any explanation for their sporadic attention to
this case.
5.

In the five (5) years this case was pending in the Trial

Court, the Plaintiffs resisted Defendants' efforts to bring the
case to trial (see paragraph 2 above) and never once, until the
First Federal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, did Plaintiffs attempt
to even have a trial date set.
The foregoing five (5) points show clearly that the Court had
ample basis for dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint and that in doing
so the Court did not abuse its discretion.
Rule 41(b) URCP has been applied by this Court on several
occasions.

In Brasher Motor and Finance Company v. Richard A.

Brown, 461 P.2d 464 (Utah 1969), the Court affirmed dismissal of
a counterclaim that had been pending for 5-1/2 years.

The Court

made the following pertinent observation:
In our opinion, the trial court in urging a plague
on both of the litigants' houses by its sua sponte
action, made a gesture that, if employed by more judges,
could aid in the elimination of backlogs, and help to
restore that loss of public confidence in the judiciary
engendered thereby. (P. 464)
In Maxfield v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a medical malpractice
action which had been pending for just two (2) years when the
plaintiff had been dilatory in responding to defendant's discovery

14

efforts and had resisted defendant's efforts to get the case to
trial.
In the recent case of Charlie B r o w n , supra, the U t a h Court of
A p p e a 1 s a £ f 1 rmed d i smi s s a 1 o f t he p 1 a I n 11, f f ' s c omp 1 a i n t on t he
following set of facts:
3.

Plaintiff's Complaint was filed June 15, 1981.

2. Ten and one-half months later on May 2 7 , 1982,
plaintiffs moved to amend their Complaint and noticed up
depositions. The depositions were postponed until July
9, 1982,
3. On July 9 and 16, 1982, defendants filed for a
protective order.
4. Nine months later, on April 4, 1983, plaintiffs
filed Interrogatories.
5. On December 5, 1983, after eight more months of
inactivity, the Court sua sponte issued an Order to Show
Cause returnable March 19, 1984 which was continued to
April 16, 1984.
The Order to Show Cause was again
continued for sixty days.
6. On April 3 0 , 1984, the Court sua sponte set the
case for trial June 18, 1984. When no one appeared for
trial on June 18, 1984, the Court dismissed the case wi th
prejudice on the merits.
The Charlie Brown, supra, case had been pending for three (3)
years when it was dismissed.

The Court addressed the plaintiff's

argument tha t the d ismissaJ was art abuse of the Cour t:' s d i scretion
and stated:
Dismissal for failure to prosecute is a decision within
the broad discretion of the trial court. This court will
not interfere with that decision unless it clearly
appears that the court has abused its discretion and that
there is a likelihood an injustice has been wrought.
(P. 1370)

15

In affirming the dismissal, the Court quoted with approval the
following language from Lake Meredith Reservoir Co. v. Amity Mutual
Irrigation Co. . 698 P.2d 1340 (Colo. 1985), "The burden is upon the
plaintiff to prosecute a case in due course without unusual or
unreasonable delay".
language

from

The Court also quoted with approval the

the Maxfield

case, supra, that Plaintiffs

are

required "to prosecute their claims with due diligence, or accept
the penalty of dismissal."

(Maxfield at p. 1325^

The Utah Court of Appeals in Charlie Brown also addressed the
propriety of the trial court's dismissal "with prejudice".

The

Court affirmed the dismissal with prejudice and stated:
In the instant case, the trial court provided plaintiffs
an opportunity to be heard and to do justice. Plaintiffs
nevertheless abused their opportunity through dilatory
conduct. We therefore find no abuse of discretion and
affirm the trial court's order ... (P. 1371)
Perhaps if Plaintiffs had presented any reason or justifiable
basis for sixty (60) months of delay and inaction, their claims
could be viewed more favorably, but a review of Plaintiffs' Motion
For New Trial and Memorandum and Objection to Findings and Order
of Dismissal shows no reason for such delay and inaction.
are no reasons given in Plaintiffs' Brief.
reason

for

Plaintiffs'

actions

and

delays

There

The only suggested
are

in

counsel's

Affidavit dated February 6, 1989 (R-295):
Plaintiffs have moved forward with the case as quickly
as their schedule and counsel's schedules would allow,
in view of the limited discovery responses and the
totality
of
events
needing
their
attention.
(Paragraph 3)
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Defendants submit that Defendants should not be penalized
because Plaintiffs and their counsel are, i n essence, "too busy".
Plaintiffs do not claim that there are ongoing negotiations causing
delay, that someone? is ill or unavailable, that the case is complex
or difficult—just that Plaintiffs and their counsel have bus]/
"schedules" and a "totality of events needing their attention".
Defendants submit these facts dire not: reasons, but excuses, and
support the Trial Court's Dismissal.
Plaintiffs contend that dismissal of their case is a denial
of due process under the United States arid Utah State Const,, i tutions
and prohibits them from having their constitutional right to a
remedy in due> course mf" law

(See p. vii of Plaintiffs' Brief.)

Plaintiffs cite not one case or statute suggesting that substantive
or procedural due process has ever been applied in the manner they
suggest.
Admittedly, Plaintiffs had a right to the trial of their case,
but the state at the same time has the right to place reasonable
limitations on those rights and to cut those rights off when those
reasonable limitations have been exceeded. In this case, the Court
• lid ii«")t den> Plaintiffs their right to a trial, Plaintiffs denied
themselves that right by their conduct in failing to pursue their
right in an active and meaningful way over a period of more than
five (5) years,

Plai ntiffs have not cited to this Court any case

holding that dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is denial
of due process of law or of access to the Courts.

17

Due process of law has two

(2) aspects.

The first is

procedural due process which is a rule that "... no one shall be
personally barred until he has had his day in court, by which is
meant until he has been duly cited to appear and has been afforded
the opportunity to be heard."

(16A Am.Jur.2d on "Constitutional

Law", §813 p. 968)
The

second

aspect

is

substantive

due

process

or

the

"... guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his life,
liberty, or property for arbitrary reasons . . . •• (16A Am.Jur.2d on
"Constitutional Law", §816, p. 978)
In

this

case,

Plaintiffs

have

not

been

denied

either

procedural or substantive due process, nor were they unreasonably
deprived of access to the Court.

Plaintiffs were afforded the

right to be heard and have their case brought to trial. That right
extended for over five (5) years.

During this time they did

nothing of substance to prosecutes their claims. They were dilatory
in the extreme, and such action as they took was in response to
pressure

from the Defendants

and the Court.

The right and

opportunity to be heard was not taken from Plaintiffs by dismissal
of this action, it was forfeited by Plaintiffs by reason of their
extended inactivity.
Nor have Plaintiffs been denied substantive due process.
Their Complaint was not dismissed for arbitrary reasons.
as

shown

by

the

Court

file, there was

protracted

Indeed,
delay by

Plaintiffs even after Defendants had twice requested a trial and
after the Trial Court had twice ordered Plaintiffs to show cause
18

why their case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
The action of the Trial Court was not arbitrary but was based on
a solid record compiled by Plaintiffs justifying dismissal of the
case.
Plaintiffs make no claim that they did not have an adequate
time to prepare a meaningful response to Defendants' Motion; there
is no claim by the Plaintiffs that they did not have a meaningful
opportunity to be heard through the written documents which they
filed with the Court on at least three (3) occasions, that being
the response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the Objection to
Defendants' proposed Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal, and
Plaintiffs' Motion For a New Trial and supporting documentation to
each of the foregoing.
limitation

placed

There is no evidence that there was any

upon

the

Plaintiffs

as

to

that

documentation which they could submit to the Court.

written

There is no

evidence that Plaintiffs did not have every opportunity to present
every

available

position,

and

defense
there

is

or

consideration

no

evidence,

in

other

favor
than

of

their

some

bare

allegations and innuendo without any supporting facts whatsoever,
that Plaintiffs' position did not receive a complete, fair and
impartial consideration by the Trial Court.
In the exercise of its discretion, the Trial Court acted by
authority of Rule 41(b) URCP.

It is held that even independent of

Rule or statute, the Court has inherent power to dismiss a case.
The Idaho Supreme Court in the case of Hansen v. Firebaugh, 392
P.2d 202 (Idaho 1964), held:
19

It must be conceded that by the great weight of authority the
power of courts to dismiss a case because of a failure to
prosecute with due diligence is inherent and independent of
any statute or rule of court. (P. 203)
And the Utah Supreme Court in Charlie Brown, supra, quoted
with approval the following language from Brasher Motor, supra:
In dismissing an action for want of prosecution, the
court may proceed under [Rule 41(b)], or it may, of its
own motion, take action to that end, (P. 1370)
This power is deemed to be necessarily vested in trial courts
to

manage

their

own

affairs

so

expeditious disposition of cases.
§48, p. 38)

as

to

achieve

orderly

and

(24 Am.Jur.2d on "Dismissal",

The Trial Court acted prudently, fairly and within

its discretion in dismissing the action.

II.
WAS THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS A HEARING ON THE
MOTION OF THE FIRST FEDERAL DEFENDANTS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR?
Plaintiffs

cite

Rule

4-501(9) of

the

Code

of

Judicial

Administration, which provides that where the granting of a motion
would dispose of the action on the merits with prejudice, the party
resisting the motion may request a hearing and such request shall
be granted.

Plaintiffs made such a request, but the Trial Court

ruled upon the Motion to Dismiss without a hearing.

Plaintiffs

contend this is reversible error.
The Plaintiffs have not shown by affidavit or argument before
either the Trial Court or this Court how they have been prejudiced
by the failure of the Trial Court to give them a hearing on
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Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.

Simultaneous with their request

for a hearing, the Plaintiffs also filed a Memorandum opposing the
Motion.

The Court had this written Memorandum before it when it

made its decision to dismiss Plaintiffs' case. Plaintiffs did not
in their Memorandum offer any reason for their delay in prosecuting
their case or any evidence they could or proposed to present at a
hearing to justify their delay.
Memorandum Decision:

The Trial Court concluded in its

"Even their (Plaintiffs') responses do not

produce logical reasons for failing to proceed with prosecution of
their claims."
After the Memorandum Decision, when Plaintiffs knew their case
had been dismissed and they asked for a new trial, they did not
come forth with any affidavits or reasons for their delay in
prosecuting their case.
hearing.

They simply said they should have a

Though they wrote Memoranda to the Court, both in

opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and in support of their Motions
for a New Trial, they did not, in either case, show that they had
any matters to present at a hearing that they had not presented in
their Memoranda.
In response to Plaintiffs' Motion for a New Trial, the Court
held in its Memorandum Decision of February 27, 1989, "Plaintiffs
have, in their motion (for a new trial) used the same arguments
that were used on the prior motion."

(R-304)

And in their Brief to this Court, Plaintiffs have failed to
state any reason for their delay in prosecuting the case.

Their

Brief is devoted to showing why their case should not have been
21

dismissed on the law and the facts, but they have said nothing
about what reasons they could have presented for their delay had
they been given a hearing.
In short, from all arguments Plaintiffs have made to this
Court and the Trial Court, there is nothing to show that they have
been prejudiced by not having a hearing.

All of their facts and

legal arguments were considered by the Trial Court.
matters

dehors

the

record

that

the Trial Court

If there were
should

have

considered, they were never offered to the Trial Court either in
opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in support of
Plaintiffs' Motion For a New Trial, nor have they been offered to
this Court.

The record gives ample justification for the Court's

Order of Dismissal.

A hearing would not have changed the record

from which the Court made its decision.
Even if the failure to grant Plaintiffs a hearing is deemed
by this Court to be reversible error, then the remedy should be to
remand the case to the Trial Court for a hearing on Plaintiffs'
Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs contend the case should be remanded
for trial.

Such an action would eviscerate the purpose of Rule

4-501(9) of the Code of Judicial Administration, which is to give
a person a hearing on a motion which would, if granted, dispose of
his case on the merits.

The only right Plaintiffs were deprived

of was a right to a hearing, and this Court can remedy that wrong
by remanding the case for a hearing on Plaintiffs' Objection to
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. This Court should not go beyond the
action necessary to remedy the Trial Court's error, if any.
22

Plaintiffs made a request for attorney's fees and costs under
Rules 33 and 34 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.

It is

clear that Rule 33 is designed to deal with circumstances in which
appeals

are

taken

substantial merit.

for the purpose

of

delay

or without

any

It is not designed to protect the Appellant,

inasmuch as it is the Appellant who makes the determination to make
the appeal.

As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "We recognize

the sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be applied in
egregious cases, lest there be an improper showing of the right to
appeal erroneous lower court decisions." Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d
365, 369 (Utah App. 1988).

There is no basis in the case before

the Court to assess attorney's fees against the Defendants under
Rules 33 or 34 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, and
Plaintiffs argue no basis for assessment of the same.

CONCLUSION
It is clear under the facts of this case that the Trial Court
did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint
for failure to prosecute.

Rather, the action of the Trial Court

in dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint for failure to prosecute is
amply justified by the facts. The law of this state, both by Rule
and the decision of this Court and the Utah Supreme Court, permit
and give

precedence for the dismissal.

The Plaintiffs have not

been deprived of a right by any arbitrary action of the Trial Court
or without an opportunity to press and present their claim.
Rather, their right to assert their claim has been dismissed by
23

reason of their own neglect and inaction. Finally, the Plaintiffs
have shown no prejudice to them resulting from failure of the Trial
Court to grant them a hearing on their Objection to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss.

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence or

argument to the Court justifying their delay.

There is nothing to

be gained by a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss beyond what
has already been presented to the Trial Court or this Court.
Plaintiffs have not presented one fact, case, argument or piece of
evidence that they claim needs additional consideration by the
Trial Court in order to render a fair and correct decision.

For

these reasons, the judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
If, however, this Court determines that a hearing should have been
granted to Plaintiffs and the failure is reversible error, this
Court's decision should be to remand the case to the Trial Court
for the purpose of such a hearing on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.
DATED this 28th day of July, 1989.
Respectfully submitted,
OLSON & HOGGAN

/^J^JU/:

*L. Brent Hoggan
Attorneys for De4Teffdant First
Federal, Hunsaker, Chadaz and
Bearnson

HAND-CARRY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered ja^t exact copy of the
foregoing Brief of the Respondents First Federal Savings & Loan
Association of Logan, Fred Hunsaker and Brian Chadaz, as Officers
and as Individuals, and Brad H. Bearnson, Trustee, to Plaintiffs'
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Attorney, Raymond N. Malouf, at 250 East 200 North, Suite D, Logan,
Utah 84321 and to N. George Daines, Attorney for Defendants Norman
Barber, Helen Barber and N. George Daines, at 108 North Main, Suite
201, Logan, Utah 84321, this 28th day of July, 1989-

^ ^ y ^ ^

*%h?

L. Brent Hogg,
lbh/2
stocking.bri
N-55.89aF
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA
H. STOCKING, husband and
wife,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff
v.

Civil No.

22183

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS and
LOAN ASSOCIATION of Logan,
et al,
Defendants

Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss on the basis of
Plaintiff's failing to prosecute their claim in a timely manner.
It was filed November 3, 1982 and a temporary order issued.
Plaintiff's Temporary Order was dismissed and a trustee sale
re-scheduled and conducted the same day.

On October 28, 198 3,

Plaintiff filed an amended complaint to which an answer was filed.
Defendant filed a Motion for Notice of Readiness for Trial for
March 21, 1984.

Plaintiff has objected to these Notices of

Readiness they have been delaying this for some six years now. It
seems that it could have proceeded in a much more timely fashion.
Even their responses do not produce logical reasons for failing
to proceed with the prosecution of their claim.
Therefore, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is granted, and
counsel for Defendants to prepare the appropriate order.
p

Dated this

) ^ day of January, 19 89.

\L LCULm j j ^ . >t , U4 ^ f^
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321-0525
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL
WITH PREJUDICE

vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED
HUNSAKER and BRIAN CHADAZ as
officers and as individuals;
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee;
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
successor beneficiaries;
N. GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN
DOES 1-8,

Civil No. 22183

Defendants.

In this matter Defendants First Federal Savings & Loan
Association of Logan, Fred Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H.
Bearnson, filed a Motion pursuant to Rule 41(b) to dismiss
Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice for failure to prosecute the
& HOGGAN

same and therewith filed a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in

EYS AT LAW
ST CENTER

Support of said Motion, and Defendants Norman Barber, Helen

BOX 525
JTAH 84321

Barber, and N. George Daines joined in said Motion in writing.

752-1551

Plaintiffs objected to said Motion and filed their objection with

TON OFFICE.

a Memorandum in support thereof in writing.

The Court having read

AST MAIN

30X 1 1 5
M. UTAH 84302
257-3885
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£8G

-2and considered said Motions and the Memoranda in support and
opposition thereto, having examined the file, and on January 19,
1989 having made its Memorandum Decision in writing, now makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
From the record in the file on this matter, the Court finds:
1. Plaintiffs1 Complaint was filed November 3, 1982 and a
Temporary Restraining Order was issued the same day to restrain
Defendants First Federal Savings & Loan Association of Logan, Fred
Hunsaker, Brian Chadaz and Brad H. Bearnson from proceeding with a
Trustee's sale of Plaintiffs' property.
2. The Trustee's sale scheduled November 3, 1983 was
postponed one (1) day to November 4, 1983, and on November 4,
1983, a hearing was held before the Honorable VeNoy Chris toffersen
on Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order. As a result of the
hearing, Plaintiffs' Temporary Restraining Order was dismissed on
November 4, 1983, and the Trustee's sale as rescheduled was
conducted the same day.
3. On November 7, 1983, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Complaint.
4. On November 28, 1983, Plaintiffs filed an Amended
Complaint.
5. On December 8, 1983, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed an Answer to Plaintiffs' Amended
Complaint.
6. On February 3, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Motion For Partial Summary Judgment,
which was denied by the Court in a Memorandum Decision dated March
19, 1984.
7. On March 21, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,
Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Notice of Readiness for Trial.

a.©7

-3Plaintiffs objected to the Notice on April 2, 1984, stating in
their objection, "Plaintiffs intend to prepare and complete
discovery both with interrogatories and depositions.11
8.

On July 6, 1984, Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker,

Chadaz and Bearnson filed a Second Notice of Readiness for Trial,
to which Plaintiffs objected stating, "... plaintiffs are
proceeding with discovery/'
9.

On July 11, 1984, Plaintiffs served Interrogatories and a

Request For Admission on Defendants Chadaz and Bearnson, to which
Bearnson filed Answers on July 18, 1984 and Chadaz filed Answers
on August 10, 1984.
10.

On January 13, 1986, the Court, on its own motion,

issued an Order returnable January 27, 1986 for Plaintiffs to show
cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
prosecute the same.
11.

On January 23, 1986, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the

Court's Order to Show Cause and in their Motion stated, "Plaintiffs intend to bring this matter to trial after their evidence
has been completed.

The appraiser has not completed the work he

indicated would be done sometime ago and Plaintiffs are reminding
him of the commitment to complete the work."
12.

On January 27, 1987, the Court, on its own motion,

issued an Order, returnable February 9, L987, for Plaintiffs to
show cause why their Complaint should not be dismissed for failure
to prosecute the same.
13.

On February 5, 1987, Plaintiffs moved to dismiss the

Court's Order to Show Cause, and in their motion stated, "PlainftHOGGAN tiffs have not left this case unpursued, but have been preparing
EVSATUAW
forward with it. ... They desire that this matter eventually
tQ
;T CENTER
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be

s e t

for

t r i a l , and anticipate being ready to file a request
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within the year."
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14. On February 6, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Set of
Request For Admissions, First Set of Interrogatories and For
Production of Documents" on Defendants Barber. These discovery
requests were answered by Defendants Barber on March 11, 1987.
15. On September 4, 1987, Defendants Barber moved the Court
for partial summary judgment, which motion was denied by the
Court's Memorandum Decision dated October 6, 1987.
16. On November 25, 1987, Plaintiffs served a "First Set of
Interrogatories11 on Defendants First Federal, Hunsaker, Chadaz and
Bearnson. Defendants First Federal and Hunsaker answered the
Interrogatories on December 23, 1987; Defendant Bearnson answered
the Interrogatories on December 22, 1987, and Defendant Chadaz
answered the Interrogatories on December 23, 1987.
17. No action has been taken by Plaintiffs on their claim
since December 23, 1987.
18. Based upon the foregoing Findings from the record in the
file, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to prosecute
their claims in this case in due course and without unreasonable
delay.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein should
be dismissed with prejudice.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that
Plaintiffs' Complaint and all claims therein as against all
Defendants be and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
It is further ORDERED that the trial date for this case* of
April 11, 1989 as a second setting and May 23, 1989 as a first
setting be and are stricken.
DATED this , ^
day of January, 1989.

BOX 525
UTAH 84321
752 1551

<oy~ U,h"c¥sXott&tsen
DistMfct Judge /
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-5CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that an exact copy of the foregoing Findings of
Fact and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was served upon Plaintiffs' counsel, Raymond N. Malouf, personally by delivering a copy
to his office at 150 East 200 North in Logan, Utah this 20th
day of January, 1989, and that an exact copy of the foregoing
Findings of Fact and Order of Dismissal With Prejudice was served
upon N. George Daines, III, Attorney for Defendants Barber,
personally by delivering a copy to his office at 108 North Main,
Suite 200, Logan, Utah, this 20th day of January, 1989.

\'M

'iffany Parlor ;
Tirrany
Secretary to L. Brent Hoggan
"i

LBH/20

& HOGGAN
IEYS AT LAW

ST CENTER
SOX 325
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF CACHE
STATE OF UTAH
VON K. STOCKING and
DONNA H. STOCKING, husband
and wife,
Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Civil No.

v.

22183

FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS and
LOAN ASSOCIATION, et al
Defendants

Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for a New Trial.

There

was no trial in this case, the issue was put to the Court on a
Motion to Dismiss for failure to prosecute and decided by the
Court from the record on that basis.

Plaintiffs have, in their

motion, used the same arguments that were used on the prior motion.
Therefore, the Motion for a NewJTrial is denied and
counsel for defendants to prepare the appropriate order.
Dated this

- )^1

day of February, 1989.
BY THE COURT:
/
/

VeNoy "Ch'rlsteffersek
District Judge
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L. Brent Hoggan (#1512)
OLSON & HOGGAN
Attorneys at Law
56 West Center
P.O. Box 525
Logan, Utah 84321
Telephone: 752-1551
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CACHE
VON K. STOCKING and DONNA H.
STOCKING, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER DENYING NEW TRIAL

vs.
FIRST FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN
ASSOCIATION OF LOGAN, FRED
HUNSAKER AND BRIAN CHADAZ, as
officers and as individuals,
BRAD H. BEARNSON, Trustee;
NORMAN BARBER and HELEN BARBER,
successor beneficiaries; N.
GEORGE DAINES, and JOHN DOES 1-8,

S3co

Civil No. 22183

Defendants.
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BOX 525
UTAH 84321
752 1551
ITON OFFICE
EAST MAIN

In this matter the Court having made and entered its Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Decree on January
27, 1989 dismissing Plaintiffs1 Complaint and all claims therein
with prejudice and Plaintiffs having thereafter filed with this
Court a Motion For New Trial and in support thereof having filed a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and Defendants having filed
responsive Memorandum to said Motion For New Trial and the Plaintiff a rebuttal to Defendants1 response, and the Court having
examined the Motion of Plaintiffs and the Memoranda of the parties
for and against the same, now finds that the arguments of Plaintiffs in support of their Motion For New Trial were the same

SOX 1 1 5
N UTAH 8 4 3 3 7
257 3885

'BAR 0 ? ft®

Ni inh^r
FILED

jLi^

—

r-4 1 r*«^0
33

By ' I x O

"5rf\^

-2arguments submitted by Plaintiffs in their opposition to
Defendants1 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint and that there
are no new matters or arguments raised by Plaintiffs in said
Motion For New Trial and the Court on February 27, 1989 having
made and entered its Memorandum Decision, and the Court being
fully adivsed in the premises, it is now
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Plaintiffs1 Motion For New
Trial be and the same is hereby denied.
DATED this

l4 day of March, 1989.

District
CERTIFICATE OF PERSONAL SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally served an exact copy of
the foregoing Order Denying New Trial upon N. George Daines,
Attorney for himself and Defendants Barber, and upon Raymond N.
Malouf, Attorney for Plaintiffs, by delivering a copy to each at
their law offices in Logan, Utah, this 1st day of March, 1989.

Tiffany Parker
Secretary to L. Brent Hoggan
LBH/38
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